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Prosecutors are Permitted to Display Admissible
Weapons to Juries During Opening Statements in
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Parker
PENNSYLVANIA - CRIMINAL LAW - OPENING STATEMENTS -
EVIDENCE - HANDGUN - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a
prosecutor to display a tangible object during the opening state-
ments where the prosecution intended to introduce the object dur-
ing trial as evidence and where there was no issue as to the ad-
missibility of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Parker, 919 A.2d 943 (Pa. 2007).
On the evening of April 2, 2002, Sheila Crump and her brother
Dwayne Crump arrived at a store with their friend, James Wash-
ington.1 Upon approaching the entrance, Sheila and Dwayne en-
countered Appellee Maurice Parker. 2 Sheila claimed that Parker
and her brother shared a suspicious look, so she waited outside as
her brother entered the store. 3 Parker then encountered Wash-
ington and began an argument, in which Parker displayed a hand-
gun. 4 Dwayne became involved, causing Parker to begin shooting;
a bullet hit Washington, who left the scene and drove himself to
the hospital.5 Sheila claimed that Parker did not stop firing the
weapon until he ran out of ammunition. 6 In the subsequent trial,
the prosecutor's display of this weapon during the opening state-
ments and the consequential effect on the jury created the issue
considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Parker.7 The issue presented was whether it is admissible for
prosecutors to display physical pieces of evidence during opening
1. Commonwealth v. Parker, 919 A.2d 943, 945 (Pa. 2007).
2. Parker, 919 A.2d at 945.
3. Id. Sheila described the look as an "odd look." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 945-46. Dwayne informed Parker that everything between them was "cool."
Id.
6. Id. at 946.
7. Parker, 919 A.2d at 945.
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statements, when that evidence would be admitted at a later point
in the trial: a question of first impression.8
On April 5, 2002, Sheila saw Parker at her apartment complex
and contacted Officers Stacey Alston and Rosalind Mason, who
also observed Parker and his mother at the apartment. 9 The offi-
cers questioned Parker, learned he was sixteen years old, and
based on his demeanor, found it necessary to place him in hand-
cuffs. 10 During the questioning, Parker requested a restroom
break, which was granted on the condition that his mother enter
the restroom with him while Officer Alston stood at the door. 11
Officer Alston heard noises coming from the restroom followed by
Parker's mother inquiring about an object belonging to Parker. 12
Alston entered the restroom and found a loaded .38 caliber hand-
gun in the toilet.13 Alston detained Parker, charging him with
attempted murder, aggravated assault, violations of the Uniform
Firearms Act, and possessing an instrument of a crime. 14
Parker's trial was set for February 17, 2004.15 Prior to trial, the
prosecutor notified the court that it was his intention to display
Parker's handgun during his opening statement.16 Parker's coun-
sel objected, claiming the display was unnecessary because the
handgun would be admitted during the trial and because it would
be prejudicial. 17 The trial court denied the objection, finding no
Pennsylvania statues or case law prohibiting such a display dur-
ing opening statements.18 The judge instructed the jury regarding
the purpose of opening statements. 19 The prosecutor showed the
jury Parker's handgun during his opening statements. 20 The jury
8. Id. at 948.
9. Id. at 946.
10. Id. The officers believed Parker's behavior created a safety concern. Id.
11. Id.
12. Parker, 919 A.2d at 946.
13. Id.
14. Id. The charges were pursuant to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901, 2702, 6106 and
907 (West 1998 and Supp. 2008), respectively.




19. Id. The trial court explained to the jury that opening statements were not evidence,
but an introduction to the case and to defenses by the respective attorneys. Id.
20. Parker, 919 A.2d at 946. In his opening statement, the prosecutor said:
While [Parker] was in the restroom one of the officers arranges so that she can
look from an angle to make sure that nothing was happening. He was fidgety.
The officer will testify that as she sees him fidget she hears a clunk, a thud
sound. She pulls open the door and sitting inside the toilet is this particular
weapon. And for the record, I have made it safe so there is nothing at this
Vol. 46680
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subsequently found Parker guilty of all charged crimes, and
Parker was sentenced to seven and a half to fifteen years in
prison. 21
On appeal, the superior court ruled that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying defendant's objection to the display of the
weapon, but that the abuse of discretion was a harmless error.
22
Justice Bender, writing for the majority, discussed the abuse of
discretion standard, which is the applicable standard for eviden-
tiary challenges; he explained that "discretion" implied an objec-
tive and rational approach based on legal concepts and reason
alone. 23 In considering admissibility of evidence, trial courts may
exercise wide discretion in balancing the prejudicial nature
against the probative value of the evidence and are allowed to ex-
clude the evidence only where the unduly prejudicial effect out-
weighs the probative value. 24
Next, the superior court analyzed the purpose of opening state-
ments in a criminal trial and the prejudicial effect of an inflamma-
tory piece of evidence used in the course of those statements. 25 In
describing opening statements as an outline of each attorney's
case, Justice Bender acknowledged the importance of this portion
of the trial since the jury is at a critical point in developing initial




22. Commonwealth v. Parker, 882 A.2d 488, 494-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). In explain-
ing the issue, Judge Bender said: "Appellant presents for our review an issue of first im-
pression in Pennsylvania, that being whether it is proper for a prosecutor to display or use
as a prop, a potentially inflammatory piece of evidence during opening statements."
Parker, 882 A.2d at 492.
23. Parker, 882 A.2d at 492. On the discretion of the trial court, the superior court
quoted:
The term "discretion" imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom, and skill so as
to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law .... Dis-
cretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice, or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when
the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the
judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where
the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000).
24. Parker, 882 A.2d at 492. See PA. R. EVID. 403: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury .... Unfair prejudice means a tendency to suggest
decisions on an improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weigh-
ing the evidence impartially. See PA. R. EVID. 404(b)(3).
25. Parker, 882 A.2d. at 493.
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opinions of the facts. 26 The superior court also recognized that at
this crucial stage, the jury should not be prejudiced by displays of
evidence so that at the start of the trial the prosecution and de-
fense have a fair opportunity to prove their case. 27 Like the trial
court, the superior court also pointed out that there is no Pennsyl-
vania statute or case law governing this issue. 28 The superior
court, finding no Pennsylvania authority, looked to cases from
other jurisdictions for guidance.
29
Justice Bender ultimately concluded that there is no reasonable
purpose to display a handgun during opening statements, and
that such a display would only disrupt the important balance be-
tween the parties, unfairly influencing the jury. 30 The superior
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant Parker's objection, reasoning that it was unnecessary to use
visuals and props during opening statements to achieve their in-
tended purpose and that a weapon may create bias and discomfort
among the jurors. 31 Due to the prosecutor's strong case and the
overwhelming evidence of Parker's guilt, the superior court held
that the display during the opening statements did not affect the
outcome of the case, ruling it a harmless error.
32
26. Id. Judge Bender said: "Since the jurors' minds are essentially 'blank slates' at this
stage of the trial, opening statements can have a tremendous impact on the ultimate out-
come of the trial." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 492. Rule 604 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure does not rule
on the use of evidence or displays during the statements but states: "After the jury has
been sworn, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall make an opening statement to the
jury. The defendant or the defendant's attorney may then make an opening statement or
reserve it until after the Commonwealth has presented its case." PA. R. CRIM. P. 604.
29. Parker, 919 A.2d at 496. In opposition to the Government's argument, the court
considered Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Ky. 1994) (allowing a prosecu-
tor to display photographs during opening statements) and People v. Green, 302 P.2d 307
(Cal. 1956). Parker, 882 A.2d at 493. In support of Parker's argument, the court consid-
ered cases from other jurisdictions. Id. at 493-95. See Guerrero v. Smith, 864 S.W.2d 797,
799-800 (Tex. App. 1993) (plaintiffs attorney was not permitted to show a photograph dur-
ing opening statements); Wimberli v. Okla., 536 P.2d 945 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (knife
was permitted to be shown during an opening statement despite criticism of the practice);
People v. Williams, 456 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (prosecutor was not permitted
to display a shotgun during opening statements).
30. Parker, 882 A.2d at 494.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 494-95. "The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects
the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, but not necessarily a perfect or error-
free trial." Id. at 495 (citing Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2001)).
An error may be deemed harmless by an appellate court where the properly
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the
error is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
682 Vol. 46
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Judge Olszewski wrote a concurring opinion, finding that the
majority ruled correctly in affirming the verdict, but that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to dis-
play a handgun during opening statements. 33 Judge Olszewski
concluded that the jury would not be unfairly prejudiced by view-
ing the weapon during the opening statements because the jury
would eventually see the handgun when admitted into evidence
during the trial and because the prosecutor would still describe
the handgun in detail.
34
Both parties filed appeals based on the superior court holding,
with the Commonwealth arguing that there was no abuse of dis-
cretion and Parker claiming that the error was not harmless.
35
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur on these
issues. 36 Writing for the majority, Justice Baldwin held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion and that the superior court
erred in its holding, especially in citing cases from other jurisdic-
tions having no authority in Pennsylvania. 37
Justice Baldwin began with an interpretation of the possible
and likely impact on jurors that would result after viewing the
criminal weapon. 38 She wrote, again reiterating a lack of Penn-
sylvania authority prohibiting the display, that the Superior Court
incorrectly weighed the effect of the sight of a handgun on jurors
and opined that the display of handguns should be admissible as
long as criminals continue to use weapons for the charges at is-
sue. 3
9
Parker set forth four arguments during the trial which Justice
Baldwin subsequently addressed. 40 First, Parker argued that the
weapon had not yet been admitted as evidence when displayed to
Id. (citing Commnw. v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 165-66 (Pa. 1978)). The court found over-
whelming evidence based on Sheila's testimony and identification of Parker, Officer
Alston's identification of the gun, and Officer Bottomer testimony as to the gun residue
found at both locations by the same weapon. Id.
33. Id. at 495 (Olszewski, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 495-96.
35. Parker, 919 A.2d at 948.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 950.
38. Id. at 949.
39. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited Commonwealth v. McAndrews, 430
A.2d 1165 (Pa. 1981), which held that a trial court was correct in allowing a prosecutor to
use a weapon for a demonstration, despite the fact that the weapon was not admissible at
trial. Id. The court distinguished McAndrews from Parker, where the weapon displayed
was admissible at trial. Id. It also cited Commonwealth v. Harris, 424 A.2d 1245 (Pa.
1981), where the prosecutor was allowed to display a weapon only similar to the weapon
involved in the crime. Id.
40. Parker, 919 A.2d at 949.
Summer 2008
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the jury. 41 Justice Baldwin rebutted this argument, stating there
was no question as to the admissibility of the weapon displayed. 42
Parker further alleged that it was unnecessary to use the weapon
in the opening statement, as opening statements are not to be evi-
dentiary in nature and the weapon was evidence that would be
admitted later. 43 The court responded that viewing a weapon did
not create any unwarranted prejudicial feelings, reasoning that
the weapon was displayed to the jury in the trial's initial stages
and that the court provided instructions that the opening state-
ments were not evidence. 44 Parker's third argument involved the
prejudice between the parties, as it is less likely for a defense at-
torney to have evidence that would cause an emotional response
upon its display during opening statements. 45 Finally, Parker
expressed concern regarding the administrative effects that would
result from the lack of a limitation on the use of evidence during
opening statements, which was addressed in Justice Castille's
concurring opinion.
46
Justice Baldwin, like the superior court, began with a review of
the abuse of discretion standard. 47 Next, she discussed the pur-
pose of opening statements, reiterating that they are not eviden-
tiary in nature, but an introduction to the facts and the positions
of each party. 48 Parties to a criminal case are permitted broad
judgment in deciding the substance of their statements. 49 How-
ever, Justice Baldwin then examined the limitations of opening
statements, noting that they must not be based on statements
41. Id.
42. Id. at 950. The Court did not comment on the question when there is a conflict as
to the admissibility of an object, as it is not an issue in this case. Id. at 950 n.8.
43. Id. at 949.
44. Id. at 951.
45. Parker, 919 A.2d at 949. The Court said:
Parker contends that using potentially inflammatory evidence in opening
statements "gives the State an unfair advantage where jurors are more likely
to consider the prosecutor, an agent of the state, to be more credible than the
defense attorney who is less likely to be the party using the inflammatory prop
Id. (quoting Parker's Brief at 14).
46. Id. at 952 (Castille, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 949-50 (majority opinion). "An abuse of discretion may not be found merely
because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result
of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of sup-
port so as to be clearly erroneous." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372,
379 (Pa. 2005)).




made for the sole purpose of provoking an emotional reaction
where there is no basis in fact. 50
The court ultimately held that the prosecutor was permitted to
use the evidence during the opening statements because the dis-
played object was within the scope of evidence intended to be in-
troduced and because the object was admissible during trial. 51
Justice Baldwin rebutted the superior court argument that the
weapon served no valuable purpose but to prejudice the jury.
52
She held that the purpose of opening statements is ultimately to
provide a verbal summary of the facts and evidence, and display-
ing the very weapon used is one means by which to achieve this
purpose. 53 Thus, the court affirmed the superior court's ultimate
holding, finding no abuse of discretion at the trial level, rendering
it unnecessary for the court to decide the issue of harmless error. 54
Justice Castille authored a concurring opinion agreeing with the
majority decision that the display of the weapon had a purpose
beyond that of creating an emotional response and sparking an
early decision among the jurors. 55 Justice Castille believed that
jurors would not find the sight of a weapon so uncommon as to
allow such a reaction. 56 Justice Castille also expressed concern of
the administrative effects of the case. 57 While he agreed with the
majority's description of the purpose of opening statements, he
worried that opening statements would become too expansive and
attorneys would lose sight of the purpose of those statements un-
der the new rule.58 He justified both the court's decision and the
prosecutor's desire to use a prop during opening statements by
admitting that, according to preconceived societal notions, jurors
have limited attention spans and are looking to compare opening
50. Parker, 919 A.2d at 950. The prosecutor must have a good faith belief that the
evidence will be available and admissible. Id. at 950 n.8. Also, the prosecutor is limited to
displaying the evidence in an appropriate manner. Id. at 951 n.9.
51. Id. at 951. "Indeed, where the tangible piece of evidence falls within the scope of
material the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial and its display during the opening
statement does not inflame the passions of the jury, the display of that piece of evidence is
wholly proper." Id. at 950.
52. Id. at 951.
53. Id. at 950-51.
54. Id. at 951.
55. Parker, 919 A.2d at 952 (Castille, J., concurring). Chief Justice Cappy joined the
concurring opinion. Id.
56. Id. Justice Castille explained that if the jurors had such a strong reaction to a
handgun, then one would not be permitted during trial, let alone opening statements, due
to the prejudice. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. "[The opening statement] is a chance to outline and describe the prosecution (or
defense) case, and not an opportunity to pre-try the matter ... " Id.
Summer 2008 685
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statements to dramas or alternative sources of entertainment. 59
Therefore, Justice Castille agreed that there is no prejudicial ef-
fect in showing evidence in opening statements, but posited that
the practice should be discouraged as outside the limited purpose
of opening statements. 60
The origins of opening statements reflect a practice adopted
early in Great Britain, where a judge instructed a prosecutor to
state all that was going to be proven prior to the presentation of
the case. 61 Throughout the development of criminal procedure in
the United States, many changes were instituted from the British
system.62 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit considered the right to opening statements and its history,
due to an absence of any federal statute concerning the matter, in
United States v. Salovitz. 63 At the trial level, Salovitz requested
the ability to present an opening statement and was denied based
on the ground that the statement would be unnecessary. 64 Sa-
lovitz's argument rested in the constitutional right to a jury trial
and the right to counsel found in the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but the court disagreed, holding that the right to an
opening statement is not guaranteed by the Constitution. 65 When
the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment in 1789, there was no
British law concerning opening statements, and it was therefore
not incorporated specifically into the United States Constitution. 66
Consequently, the addition of opening statements to the trial hap-
pened on a state-by-state basis through their own procedural stat-
utes. 67 The Second Circuit held that the procedural requirements
of opening statements should be determined by the trial court's
59. Id.
60. Parker, 919 A.2d at 952 (Castille, J., concurring).
61. See Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Ky. 1964). The Kentucky
court explained:
In an 1835 English murder trial, Rex v. Orrell, 173 Eng. Rep. 337, 338, counsel
for the prosecution, after stating the facts, indicated that there was evidence of
previous expressions and declarations of the prisoner which he (the prosecutor)
would not detail, whereat the presiding judge, upon consultation with an asso-
ciate, ruled as follows: "We think the fair course toward the prisoner is to state
all that is intended to be proved."
Calhoun, 368 S.W.2d at 223.
62. United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1983). Changes largely involved the
testimonial procedure. Salovitz, 701 F.2d at 19-20.
63. 701 F.2d at 17.
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19-20.
686 Vol. 46
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exercise of discretion, due to the lack of constitutional authority on
the matter.
68
Criminal proceedings in Pennsylvania are governed by the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allow the Com-
monwealth to present an opening statement to the jury after the
jury is sworn. 69 The content and extent of opening statements, as
well as the delivery techniques, arguably have a drastic effect on
the jury deliberation process. 
70
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Commonwealth v.
Montgomery71 that the purpose of opening statements is to provide
an outline of the party's case to the jury; the outline should in-
clude a brief history and description of the facts and the inferences
to be subsequently concluded from those facts. 72 In Montgomery,
the appellant was convicted of attempted rape, terroristic threats,
and indecent assault.73 During opening statements, the defense
attorney referenced the prosecutor's lack of corroborating evi-
dence, based on the fact that a test on a piece of evidence did not
produce the presence of semen from the alleged crime. 74 On the
afternoon of the trial, further tests were conducted and semen
stains were found on the evidence. 75 The defense filed for mis-
trial, arguing that the jury's impression would be prejudiced
68. Salovitz, 701 F.2d at 20. 'We have held in a civil case that 'opening is merely a
privilege to be granted or withheld depending on the circumstances of the individual case."'
Id. (quoting United States v. 5 Cases, More or Less, Containing "Figlia Mia Brand," 179
F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950)). The Second Circuit quoted the Supreme Court in McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971), which stated: 'The Constitution requires no more
than that trials be fairly conducted and that guaranteed rights of defendants be scrupu-
lously respected." McGautha, 402 U.S. at 222. (quoting 5 Cases, More or Less, 179 F.2d
519).
69. PA. R. CRIM. P. 604(A).
70. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 60 (1988). Guinther described the impact of
the opening statement:
The lawyer's opening statement to the jury has been described as a "potentially
awesome opportunity ... to describe [the] client's case in a convincing and per-
suasive manner," the time "for attempting to focus the jury's attention on those
few issues which when resolved by the jury in his or her client's favor, will re-
turn a favorable verdict."
Id. (quoting DAVID S. SHRAGER, OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF 1 (Roscoe
Pound Foundation n.d.)).
71. 626 A.2d 109 (Pa. 1993), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa.
2001).
72. Montgomery, 626 A.2d at 113. "[A] prosecutor's opening statement should be con-
fined to a brief statement of the issues of the case, an outline of anticipated material evi-
dence, and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1690
(2007).
73. Montgomery, 626A.2d at 110.




against the defense. 76 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recog-
nized that, while opening statements are not evidence, they are
delievered at a critical stage of the trial at which the jury is likely
to form strong opinions about the case. 77 It held that there was a
prejudice created based on the opening statements that could po-
tentially affect the integrity of the defendant's argument and the
outcome of the case, and therefore granted defendant's motion for
a new trial. 7
8
Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have held that prosecutors
should be awarded broad discretion and significant latitude in de-
termining the content of their opening statements. 79 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court restricted this latitude by limiting the
content of opening statements to that which the prosecutor plans
to prove in good faith based on the evidence, rather than allega-
tions aimed at producing emotional responses from the jury.80
The Third Circuit held, in United States v. Somers,81 that an As-
sistant United States Attorney was overly dramatic in his delivery
of opening statements, thereby exceeding the permissible scope of
opening statements and prejudicing the jury against the defen-
dant.
82
In Commonwealth v. Hughes,8 3 the defense argued that the
prosecutor made a remark during opening statements that was so
prejudicial that the defendant would be deprived of his right to a
fair trial.8 4 The supreme court explained that for evidence to be
prejudicial, the probative value must be outweighed by the preju-
dice to the defendant. 85 In Hughes, the Court held that the state-
ment was not prejudicial and thus was within the realm of the
purpose of the opening statement.86
76. Id.
77. Id. at 113.
78. Montgomery, 626 A.2d at 113-14.
79. Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 626 (Pa. 2001).
80. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 383 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1978). "A district attorney's
remarks in his opening statement must be fair deductions from the evidence the Common-
wealth in good faith expects to develop, not merely assertions intended to inflame the pas-
sions of the jury." Hughes, 383 A.2d at 886.
81. 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1974).
82. Somers, 496 F.2d at 737. The defendant alleged prosecutorial misconduct after the
Assistant U.S. Attorney "departed from that objective [of opening statements] by studding
his opening with overly-dramatic, unnecessary characterizations." Id.
83. 383 A.2d at 886.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The prosecutor informed the jury that the appellant had remarked during the
robbery: "Kill the white mother fucker." Id.
688 Vol. 46
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In Commonwealth v. Allen,8 v the superior court allowed the jury
to examine blood-stained scissors that had been used in an alleged
assault.88 To determine whether the exhibit was for the sole pur-
pose of sparking an intense passion in the jury, the court balanced
the value of the evidence with the likelihood of it creating a preju-
dicial response.
8 9
The opening statements of a criminal trial are not evidence
themselves, but are vital in increasing a juror's ability to under-
stand the facts of the case. 90 To prevent the jury from becoming
confused, prosecutors may decide to use visual aids to supplement
their oral descriptions of evidence. 91 These visual aids and refer-
ences to descriptions of evidence must refer only to admissible
evidence, even though they are not themselves considered evi-
dence. 92 However, opening statements are supposed to be both
brief and general in nature.93 Because the rules allow for the
prosecutor to test the boundaries of opening statements, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the admission and ref-
erences of evidentiary matters is within the discretion of the trial
court, allowing the appellate court to find reversible error only
where there is a flagrant abuse of discretion. 9
4
The display of an instrument of crime or weapon to the jury is
also within the discretion of the trial court. 95 The determination
of whether a weapon should be displayed in court involves the
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence when the issue is the admissibil-
ity of evidence during the trial. 96 To be admissible, the evidence
must be relevant, which means it will make an issue or fact in the
case more or less likely. 97 Additionally, the trial court has the dis-
87. 361 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
88. Allen, 361 A.2d at 397.
89. Id. Here, it is also important to note that the court instructed the jury to avoid
allowing the exhibits to prejudice their opinions of the defendants. Id. "The opening
statement of the prosecuting attorney should not refer to anything that may tend improp-
erly to prejudice the accused in the eyes of the jury." 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1690
(2007).
90. 2 LANE GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 10:6 (3d ed. 2007).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 10:5.
93. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1690 (2007).
94. Commonwealth v. Powell, 241 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. 1968).
95. Allen, 361 A.2d at 397.
96. Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 880 A.2d 608, 614 (Pa. 2005).
97. PA. R. EVID. 401.
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cretion to exclude the relevant evidence if it unfairly prejudices
the jury. 9
8
Pennsylvania had not yet determined the combination of the
two issues involving the opening statements and the displays of
weapons; specifically, it had not decided whether admissible evi-
dence may be displayed in opening statements prior to admission
in trial.99 Other jurisdictions have produced varying results. 100
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma did not find prejudi-
cial a display of a murder weapon, but criticized the use of such a
technique by the prosecuting attorney. 10 1 The Court of Appeals
for Texas, in a civil case, held that there was no abuse of discre-
tion in permitting the appellee's attorney to display an inflamma-
tory photograph. 102 However, the court said that the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure do not allow detailed descriptions or displays of
facts that will be proposed as evidence. 
103
The Supreme Court of New York's Appellate Division ruled that
a prosecutor had unfairly prejudiced the jury and became an
unsworn witness when he showed the jury that he had hid the
murder weapon on his body throughout his entire opening state-
ments. 104 The same court distinguished these circumstances in a
subsequent case where it first expressed criticism of a display of a
weapon by the prosecutor, but ultimately held that because the
weapon was later admitted and because it was not unsworn testi-
mony, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rul-
98. PA. R. EVID. 403. The rule states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence." Id.
99. Parker, 919 A.2d at 950.
100. Id. at 947-48.
101. Wimberli v. Oklahoma, 536 P.2d 945, 951-52 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). The District
Attorney displayed a knife that had been used in the alleged crime and that was later ad-
mitted into evidence. The court said, "W/e further find that the conduct of the DA in dis-
playing the weapon during the opening statement may not be the model for emulation ....
Wimberli, 536 P.2d at 952.
102. Guerrero v. Smith, 864 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that in a medical
malpractice case, it was not proper to display a photograph of the plaintiffs injuries to the
jury during opening statements, but was deemed a harmless error).
103. Guerrero, 864 S.W.2d at 799. The court opined: 'This practice misleads and con-
fuses the jurors as between counsel's mere expectations and evidence that is actually ad-
mitted." Id.
104. People v. Williams, 90 A.D.2d 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Concealability of the
murder weapon was an issue in this case. Williams, 90 A.D.2d at 196. The prosecutor
stressed this issue in his opening statements and then showed that he had been able to
conceal the weapon throughout his statements. Id. Through the prosecutor's demonstra-
tion and because concealability was an issue in the case, he became an unsworn witness
causing likely prejudice. Id. at 196.
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ing.'0 5 In approval of displays of evidence during opening state-
ments, the Supreme Courts of California and Kentucky both held
that there was not an abuse of discretion by allowing a prosecutor
to display photographs during opening statements. 106
Throughout American history, there has been continual debate
concerning the effectiveness of the common-law adversarial jury
system and the use of a panel of laypeople to decide important
questions of rights and liberties. 0 7 Despite opposition to the jury
system, it has survived and continues to be a guaranteed right,
subject to some minor limitations. 08 The debate about the effec-
tiveness of the jury trial and the competency of a jury first began
between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. 109 Hamil-
ton's argument expressed the concern that arose in Parker. He
believed that the jury was unqualified to make important deci-
sions based on complex rules of law because the jurors could not
possibly understand the laws and their applications. 110 For exam-
ple, although the jury is instructed that items displayed during
opening statements are not considered evidence, it is debatable
whether jurors properly make such a distinction during delibera-
tion. The issue of whether a jury is unduly prejudiced by viewing
the criminal weapon during the opening statements is a reflection
of the trust that the American jury system places in the members
of the jury. The court in Parker did not effectively consider the
jury's role in the trial process, and more specifically, it was insuffi-
cient in its analysis regarding the effect opening statements have
on jury deliberation."1
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that opening
statements have a significant impact on the jurors' decision, it did
105. People v. Priester, 102 A.D.2d 942 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). This case is distinguish-
able from Williams because the attorney merely discussed the weapon during the display
rather than providing a demonstrative statement. Priester, 102 A.D.2d at 942.
106. People v. Green, 302 P.2d 307, 313 (Cal. 1956); Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889
S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1994). "Even where a map or sketch is not independently admissible in
evidence it may, within the discretion of the trial court, if it fairly serves a proper purpose,
be used as an aid to the opening statement." Green, 302 P.2d at 312 (quoting State v. Si-
bert, 169 S.E. 410, 412 (W. Va. 1933)).
107. GUINTHER, supra note 70, at 31.
108. Id. at 35. Subsequent limitations include limiting juveniles' rights to jury trials,
limiting corporations' rights to jury trials where the only sentences are fines, and cases that
require certain tests to be applied. Id.
109. Id. at 31. Thomas Jefferson referred to the jury as "more precious to the mainte-
nance of a democracy than even the vote." Id.
110. Id. Alexander Hamilton "declared that jurors could understand only the most sim-
ple and obvious points." Id.
111. Parker, 919 A.2d at 949-50.
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not apply that fact to its analysis of the issue of whether display-
ing the weapon during opening statements was prejudicial. 112 Be-
tween 1953 and 1959, the University of Chicago conducted an ex-
tensive study linking social sciences to trial techniques, with por-
tions subsequently interpreted to establish that eighty percent of
the verdicts reached by juries at the conclusion of trials are the
same as if they based their decisions solely on the attorneys' open-
ing statements. 113 However, insufficient weight was given to the
fact that while eighty percent of jurors did not change their opin-
ions, other factors such as the strengths of the cases were a more
determinative resulting effect. The author of the study, Hans
Zeisel, later wrote that his own proposition has no support in re-
search and has been since misunderstood. 114 Furthermore, in op-
position to the original research, a subsequent study conducted by
The Pound Foundation found that after opening statements, sixty
percent of jurors admitted that they did not have a conclusive
opinion about one party or the other, with opinion formation not
complete until the trial's end.115
Finally, Zeisel's position was met with rebuttal from Litigation
Sciences, a jury consulting firm, and an attorney who works spe-
cifically with others to improve opening statements. 116 As a firm
that does construct valid research on such a topic, the authors
suggested that jurors connect final decisions to points or themes
from opening statements. 117 Litigation Sciences also concluded
that because members of juries often think less academically than
112. Parker, 882 A.2d at 493. "Since the jurors' minds are essentially 'blank slates' at
this stage of the trial, opening statements can have a tremendous impact on the ultimate
outcome of the trial." Id.
113. Richard J. Crawford, Opening Statement for the Defense in Criminal Cases, 8
LITIGATION 26, 26 (1982). Crawford said:
The third reason why the opening statement is so important is that jurors usu-
ally make up their minds long before the trial is over. The Chicago Project in
the 1960s suggested that 80 percent of jurors do not change their minds follow-
ing opening statements; my own judgment is that it is probably higher than
that. Real persuasion in a trial therefore comes before the presentation of evi-
dence.
Id. at 26.
114. Hans Zeisel, A Jury Hoax: The Superpower of the Opening Statement, 14
LITIGATION 17 (1987-1988) (discussing the misinterpretation of his prior published works).
115. GUINTHER, supra note 70, at 61.
116. Donald E. Vinson & Robert F. Hanley, Do Not Ignore This Opening Statement - or
Any Others: A Reply to Professor Zeisel, 15 LITIGATION 1 (1988-1989) (discussing the impor-
tance of opening statements).
117. Id. at 54. The authors suggest that jurors rely on early decisions based on human
nature to reach conclusions quickly. Id. Furthermore, because of anxiety of either difficult




professors such as Zeisel, members will reach conclusions differ-
ently and base their conclusions on the least confusing area of the
trial and the point where they are most attentive, which usually
falls during the opening statements.118 Nevertheless, all studies
agreed that the nature of the opening statements, and that which
is included in opening statements, are to some degree important to
the initial impression of the case on the jurors. 119 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, while reaching the correct decision in
Parker, failed to accurately detail this potential threat, which
jeopardizes the balance used in determining the prejudicial effect
of the display. 120
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to respond
to Parker's argument that the prosecution's ability to display evi-
dence such as a handgun in the opening statements in a criminal
case is unfairly prejudicial to defendants, who are not likely to
have such evidence to assist their case and presentation. 121 The
prosecution and defense should be at equal starting points, with-
out any jury members having a bias, at the beginning of the sub-
stantive trial. Due to the nature of the defendant's case, proving
his or her innocence and the lack of involvement in the charges at
issue does not allow the defendant many opportunities to put forth
physical evidence in front of the jury. However, there is a lack of
discussion about this issue throughout jurisdictions who have de-
cided similar cases.
Steven Lubet, in his trial advocacy hornbook, agrees that the
opening statements are vital, as human beings tend to think in
images, and therefore the images the attorneys create during
opening statements will influence the interpretation of all subse-
quent facts and testimony. 122 Lubet also dispels Parker's conten-
tion that the only purpose for the display was to prejudice or spark
emotion in the jury by asserting that visual aids and exhibits in
opening statements aid in the jury's understanding of the attor-
ney's presentation, fulfilling the purpose of opening statements. 123
Thus, while there does appear to be a benefit to displaying items
118. Id. at 55.
119. GUINTHER, supra note 70, at 60.
120. Parker, 919 A.2d at 949-50.
121. Id. at 949.
122. STEVEN LUiBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 411 (2004)
(1993). Lubet wrote: 'The attorney who is successful in seizing the opening moment will
have an advantage throughout the trial because the jury will tend to filter all of the evi-
dence through a lens that she has created." Id.
123. Id. at 459.
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during opening statements, it is related to trial and persuasion
techniques rather than the delineated scope and purpose of open-
ing statements.
There is also a counter-argument that the use of visual aids and
displays of potential evidence is expanding the intended purpose
of opening statements. Again, Justice Baldwin in her opinion
failed to adequately apply the issue at hand to the purpose of
opening statements beyond merely mentioning the purpose. In-
stead, Justice Castille, in his concurring opinion, discussed the
concern that such a display of evidence during opening statements
may broaden the purpose to a fault. 124 The United States Su-
preme Court has referred to opening statements as opportunities
to state that which will be presented and to provide an outline of
the attorney's case. 125 The purpose of opening statements implies
exactly what the name conveys, the use of a statement rather than
displays of visuals to achieve their purpose. Additionally, confu-
sion may arise from the distinction between evidence and opening
statements. While the jury will receive an instruction that open-
ing statements are not evidence, the display of evidence during
opening statements will likely invite the jurors to create connec-
tions between the object displayed and the attorney's statements,
leading the members to make inappropriate connections and give
excessive weight to opening statements during deliberation. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion did not adequately repre-
sent or examine these possible prejudicial effects on the jury,
which ultimately could have threatened the defendant's case.
Although the prosecutor's display of the handgun in Parker's
case was not prejudicial and was harmless as to Parker's convic-
tion, it was an unwarranted expansion of the leading purposes of
opening statements. Justice Castille, in his concurring opinion,
reached the underlying and practical rationale for the expansion
of the scope of opening statements. 126 He suggested that the
change in content of opening statements reflects a change in soci-
ety, that jurors have a desire for the dramatization of trials to re-
flect what they perceive and expect based on television and mov-
ies.127 The expectations of jury members places pressure on attor-
124. Parker, 919 A.2d at 952 (Castille, J., concurring).
125. Escobedo v. United States, 402 U.S. 951 (1971); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600, 612 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
126. Parker, 919 A.2d at 952 (Castille, J., concurring).
127. Id.
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neys to attempt to be innovative and entertaining during what
should be an informative introduction to the issues, evidence, and
theories of a case, in order to concentrate on impressing the jurors.
The debate remains similar to that between Jefferson and Ham-
ilton, whether laypeople can be trusted to be attentive to facts and
rules of law so as to reach a rational and just decision. To truly
reflect the original concept and ideals of the American jury sys-
tem, which places the very essence of our democracy at the hands
of jurors, not only must juries be trusted to reach just results as to
the protection of our rights and liberties, but they must also be
trusted to do so without the need for elaborate and sensationalized
displays by either prosecutors or defense attorneys in their open-
ing statements.
Amanda R. Lusk

